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This review aims to provide an insight into human learning processes by examining the role of cognitive and
emotional unconscious processing in mentally integrating visual and verbal instructional materials. Reviewed
literature shows that conscious mental integration does not happen all the time, nor does it necessarily result in
optimal learning. Students of all ages and levels of experience cannot always have conscious awareness, control,
and the intention to learn or promptly and continually organize perceptual, cognitive, and emotional processes of
learning. This review suggests considering the role of unconscious learning processes to enhance the
understanding of how students form or activate mental associations between verbal and pictorial information. The
understanding would assist in presenting students with spatially-integrated verbal and pictorial instructional
materials as a way of facilitating mental integration and improving teaching and learning performance.
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How perceptual, cognitive, and emotional processes are
interconnected as a way of facilitating or inhibiting
human learning is a recurring issue in educational and
psychological studies. Learning processes mainly refer to
the interconnections between perception, memory, lan-
guage, imagery, emotion, and motivation that allow
students to mentally build connections between verbal
and pictorial information patterns or between new and
prior memories and integrate them with relevant know-
ledge structures in long-term memory (Mayer and
Moreno 2003). Acquired knowledge structures refer to
learning outcomes (Mayer 1989). A thorough under-
standing of how students mentally form the connections
or construct knowledge structures is important for the
improvement of teaching and learning performance
(Ifenthaler and Seel 2011; Weinberger and Fischer
2006). For the better understanding, further clarification
of cognitive and emotional learning processes towards* Correspondence: seffetu@gmail.com
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in any medium, provided the original work is pthe integration of knowledge, skills, attitudes, and task
competence is needed (Baartman and De Bruijn 2011).
Learning processes and outcomes can be conscious
and unconscious. The unconscious processes range from
registering information in the sensory memory to men-
tally forming associations within or between information
patterns and activating associative memory networks, in-
cluding individual expectations, beliefs, and desires
(Kowalski and Westen 2005). The unconscious can con-
duce to the acquisition, access, and application of know-
ledge without deliberate and controlled attention (Ashby
and Maddox 2005; Dienes and Perner 1999; Evans
2008). On the contrary, a conscious learning process
starts by deliberately paying attention to instructional
materials, noticing similarities and differences between
words and their particular meanings with the help of
relevant prior experience, thereby mentally building
coherent connections between them and organizing
them into new knowledge structures (Boshuizen and
Schmidt 1992; Schmidt 1990). Thus, either conscious or
unconscious learning is primarily a combination of men-
tal processes, referred to as a knowledge acquisition
process, bringing memories into the mind, formingn Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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Moreno 2003). A permanent change in mental associa-
tions (Ormrod 2003), in long-term memory (Schnotz
and Kürschner 2007; Sweller and Sweller 2006), or a
potential change in human behaviour is considered to be
learning (Walker 1996).
When humans consciously or unconsciously engage in
learning activities inside or outside the classroom set-
ting, the effect of their potential emotions on learning
processes and outcomes is inevitable (Kowalski and
Westen 2005; Moreno 2010). Emotion is deemed to be a
reaction to significant events or stimulus that prepares
action readiness or emotional behaviours (Scherer 2009).
The human brain operates automatically and rapidly
to emotional stimuli, thereby generating unconscious
responses (Bargh and Morsella 2008; Öhman 2002;
Whalen et al. 2004). Emotions are largely elicited by
unconscious evaluations (appraisals) of subjective emo-
tional experiences (Arnold 1960; Scherer 2001). Appraisal
processes are characteristically intuitive, immediate, and
mostly outside conscious awareness (Arnold 1960), and are
not typically the product of conscious reasoning processes
(Robinson and Clore 2001). For instance, the appraisal
process underlying emotional attention, does not necessar-
ily require a complex cognitive calculus, but often occurs
automatically, unconsciously, and effortlessly (Scherer
2009). Unconscious appraisals are mostly related to intrin-
sic properties of a stimulus, such as pleasantness or un-
pleasantness, and to individual needs, values, and goals
(Scherer 1999). These appraisals generally lead to a motiv-
ational effect (Scherer 2009). Emotional processing “acts as
the on/off switch to motivation, which is the process by
which goal-directed behavior is initiated and sustained
either consciously or unconsciously” (Moreno 2010 p. 137).
Emotions evoked during learning affect the ways students
learn, such as perceiving their own ability to learn, and
guiding their attitudes toward engaging in similar learning
activities (Howe 1998).
Thus, emotional/motivational processes intervene in
instructional influences on learning activities either con-
sciously or unconsciously (Moreno 2010; Moreno and
Mayer 2007). This intervention leads to challenges for
conducting teaching and learning activities. To over-
come such challenges, an essential educational objective
is to render students conscious learners, allowing them
to become conscious of their behaviour and learning
outcomes. However, the bulk of perceptual, cognitive,
and emotional processes, and the organization of human
memory are too complex to be dealt with consciously;
therefore, conscious learning is unlikely to occur all the
time (Lewicki et al. 1992). Conscious learning can be
eased by unconscious learning processes that promptly
and continually establish connections between the per-
ceptual, cognitive, and emotional processes of learning,thereby facilitating the mental integration of verbal and
pictorial instructional materials (Kuldas et al. 2012). If
the verbal materials are properly loaded with relevant
imagery values in the use of their contents and contexts,
students can, consciously or unconsciously, form coher-
ent mental representations, manipulating complex verbal
and visual information into an easy-to-grasp format
(Paivio 1991). Accurately designed instructional mate-
rials ease the construction of mental representations,
which in turn facilitate knowledge acquisition (Ifenthaler
and Seel 2011; Seel and Blumschein 2009). However,
mental representations may unconsciously evoke task-
irrelevant thoughts and unnecessarily load visual and
verbal working memory capacity. Moreover, the spatial
integration itself can lead to an unnecessary load
(Sweller et al. 1998). To control cognitive loads, students
must be provided with an optimized instructional design
(Sweller 2010).
To enhance the understanding of how human learning
occurs and what leads to the challenges of conscious
learning, the unconscious learning processes need to be
brought to light (Thompson 2004). Recognition of differ-
ent forms of knowledge and associated psychological
processes is essential for a proper understanding of the
human mind (Disessa 2002). For a better understanding,
the primary aim of this article is to examine unconscious
learning processes and outcomes, particularly in relation
to the mental integration of pictorial and verbal instruc-
tional materials. This examination is broken down into
five sections. First, the role of unconscious processes in
organizing the human memory and learning is set out.
Second, the unconscious activation of associative mem-
ory networks and its effect on cognitive learning pro-
cesses is scrutinised. Third, the effect of unconscious
mental representations on the acquisition of verbal and
pictorial information is elaborated. Fourth, the relation
of unconscious mental representations to conceptual
learning processes is highlighted. In the final section,
conscious and unconscious processing capacity for the
mental integration of instructional materials is collated.
How human memory acquires information:
Conscious and unconscious learning processes
One of the most challenging problems in educational
and psychological studies on human memory and learn-
ing is related to the role of conscious and unconscious
processes (Schmidt 1990). In particular, existing litera-
ture provides scanty knowledge about how students con-
sciously intervene in unconscious memory and learning
processes, including their wishes, needs, beliefs, and
conflicts, thereby guiding their emotional and motiv-
ational behaviours (Gilhooley 2008). The less controver-
sial view in this regard is that perceptual, cognitive, and
emotional processes are carried out unconsciously at the
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cesses (Bargh and Morsella 2008). Humans cannot con-
stantly be in control of information encoding, storage,
and retrieval processes or readily access and manipulate
the unconsciously processed information. On the con-
trary, unconscious processes are not similarly limited.
Unconscious processing appears to be structurally and
functionally much more sophisticated than the con-
scious by accessing and influencing conscious processes
(Bargh and Morsella 2008).
The common view on how human memory acquires
information is that a limited amount of sensory informa-
tion (visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, kinaesthetic, or
gustatory) is temporarily held in short-term memory,
herein organized by working memory, and, in part, per-
manently stored in long-term memory (Baddeley 1992).
Short-term memory is transitory memory storage in
which the working memory exercises a restricted cap-
acity for performing a limited amount of information or
for organizing possible connections between and within
information patterns (Hoffman et al. 2008). Through this
limited capacity alone, students are unlikely to encode,
store, and retrieve every feature of information con-
sciously; they are likely to process and discern multiple
patterns of information unconsciously, parallel to the
conscious processing (Lewicki et al. 1992).
As a matter of fact, conscious processes (i.e. voluntary
and controlled attention, awareness, and intention) are
not persistently active to formulate or evaluate all per-
ceived information. Therefore, they are not essentially
prerequisite in discerning every bit of information at the
outset, but later are required to adjust, adapt, or inte-
grate a limited amount of information patterns into one
another (Anderson 1991; Anderson and Milson 1989;
Schmidt 1990; Walsh and Anderson 2009). In addition,
any consciously or unconsciously formulated or dis-
cerned pattern of information does not mean it is a
complete or infallible evaluation (Jou 2011). Emotional
(e.g. fear, anger, pleasure, hopes, or desire) and sensory
information are not amenable to a complete evaluation.
Even the conscious evaluation process itself, respecting
desirable and undesirable values of information, can dis-
tract the conscious mind from working on each experi-
ence (Kim and Rehder 2011).
The distinction between cognitive processes that are
unconscious with constantly active functioning capacity
and those that are conscious with limited functioning
capacity refers to dual processing accounts of the human
mind (Evans 2008; Stanovich 1999), such as implicit
and explicit (Reber 1976), automatic and controlled
(Schneider and Shiffrin 1977), experiential and rational
(Epstein 1994), intuitive and analytic (Hammond 2010),
holistic and analytic (Nisbett et al. 2001), heuristic and
analytic (Evans 2006), heuristic and systematic (Chenet al. 1999), associative and rule based (Smith and
DeCoster 2000), adaptive unconscious and conscious
(Wilson 2003), and impulsive and reflective (Strack and
Deutsch 2004). In general, relevant evidence indicates
that cognitive unconscious processes can lead to the un-
conscious acquisition of knowledge and freely influence
conscious learning processes and outcomes, but later on,
this influence can be amenable to a conscious interven-
tion (Evans 2008). Learning processes are partially amen-
able to a conscious intervention, such as conscious
awareness, conscious control, conscious intention, or de-
liberate attention (Anderson 1992; Anderson et al.
2004). A good part of information acquisition or the
processes of human learning, ranging from perceptual
information-processing to speech production, are not
necessarily subject to conscious processing (Hasher and
Zacks 1984; Jacoby et al. 1992).
Cognitive learning processes are often manipulated by
perceptual (Andrade and Deeprose 2007) and emotional
unconscious processing (Epstein 1994). Perceptual un-
conscious processing can be conceived as automatically
perceiving and holding a restricted amount of sensory
information patterns as well as perceptually priming
existing memories. Perceptual processing can lead to the
activation or retrieval of verbal memories even when
one undergoes a surgical operation or general anaesthe-
sia, that is, without his or her conscious awareness (see
Andrade and Deeprose 2007; Deeprose and Andrade
2006; Deeprose et al. 2004, 2005). In these studies,
retrieval of the memories was detected after perceptual
priming (i.e., auditory priming), presenting a word
masked in background noise during surgery to detect
the extent to which the subjects could identify accurately
the word after the surgical operation. Either subliminally
or supraliminally perceived stimuli can activate or direct
perceptual and cognitive responses when people are
awake, alert, and attentive without one having conscious
awareness, control, or intention of encoding, storing,
and retrieving information (forming mental associa-
tions), referred to as cognitive unconscious processing
(Kihlstrom 1987). The mental formation of association
within or between information patterns can be uncon-
sciously made in respect of their meanings, that is, to auto-
matically engage in the identification and categorization of
similarities among meanings as well as to insert consciously
made meanings in the ones that are unconsciously made
(Fu et al. 2010). During the formation or making meaning
process, that is, before constructed meanings are fully
reflected in the conscious mind, humans are unconsciously
guided by their past experiences, emotional states, expecta-
tions, fixed habits, and preferred thoughts (Gilhooley 2008).
They can unconsciously generate emotional responses to
an event or word stimulus based on relevant past experi-
ences (Smith and DeCoster 2000). The generation of
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related behaviour, such as approach or avoid, outside of
conscious processes, refers to emotional unconscious pro-
cessing (Chen and Bargh 1999). These perceptual, cogni-
tive, and emotional unconscious processes can facilitate or
inhibit each other’s performances in information processing
and learning activities (Kuldas et al. 2012).
In particular, a conscious intervention in emotional
processing, controlling the effect of desires, hopes, or
fears on cognitive processes, on the ways one think,
behave, or learn, is unlikely to happen all the time
(Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Bargh and Ferguson 2000;
Bruinsma 2004; Meyer and Turner 2002). In addition,
mainly due to the limited capacity of visual-sensory
information-processing; humans cannot consciously and
simultaneously encode multiple information patterns;
they must unconsciously supress or discard some visual
patterns of information (Kastner and Ungerleider 2000).
If the patterns are associated with negative emotions,
human unconsciously exert perceptual defence against
them, supressing or even blocking sensory information
that is emotionally disturbing (Dahl 2001; Pratto and
John 1991; Robinson et al. 2004; Taylor 1991). These
perceptual unconscious processes can activate several
cortical areas of the brain and bring wishes, fears, and
changes into feeling states (Blanco and Soto 2009;
Öhman and Soares 1998; Siegel and Weinberger 2009).
These effects can mediate motivational and inferential
processes that produce inaccurate judgments or deci-
sions (Efklides 2006). However, to sustain or reflect on
the outcomes of these processes (e.g. making a choice, a
goal pursuit), conscious control can be required.
As a result, humans are frequently unaware of how
they form and activate memories, being unconscious of
forming associations between memories and their re-
trieval processes (McCabe et al. 2011; Sid and Stanislas
2007; Siegel and Weinberger 2009; Sohn et al. 2005;
Weinberger and Westen 2008). Conscious processing
has a limited capacity to acquire information instantan-
eously and ceaselessly, and therefore, is likely to engage
in preliminary unconscious information-processing stage
(Barsalou 2003; Libet 1999). Hence, the conscious pro-
cessing is unlikely to result in any kind of cognitive
learning by obviating the need for the cooperation of un-
conscious processing. This assertion is further elaborated
upon in the following section.
The effect of unconscious activation of associative
memory networks on cognitive learning processes
Human memory consists of information-processing
stages, such as encoding, storage, and retrieval, which
are consciously or unconsciously associated with one an-
other (Wong et al. 1997). Associated memories are men-
tally represented in the form of a network (Anderson1995). Through this associative network, primed mem-
ory is likely to spread activation to closely or remotely
connected memories, referred to as unconscious associa-
tive priming (Ratcliff and McKoon 1981). Therefore, a
perceived information pattern can evoke pleasurable or
unpleasurable thoughts (Bunce et al. 1999; Westen
2006). Humans unconsciously tend to avoid unpleasant
thoughts and maintain pleasant ones (Epstein 1992,
1994). The human mind can arrange thought processes
without conscious intervention (Westen 1998).
This spreading activation serves to make associative
memory networks more available for further cognitive
processing, facilitating access to memories (Anderson
1995). Unconscious associative networks, such as beliefs,
wishes, thoughts, and unconscious procedures, such as
emotions, motives and defences, guide human behaviour,
affecting feeling states, flows of thoughts, and behav-
ioural tendencies (Westen 1999). When the unconscious
activation of a network leads to positive (e.g. curiosity)
and negative emotional states (e.g. mild anxiety), they
facilitate learning performance. However, they inhibit
learning when give rise to intense negative emotional states
(e.g. anxiety, panic, and insecurity) and related thoughts
such as incompetence belief (Kuyper et al. 2000).
Associative processes are also termed “implicit pro-
cesses” instead of unconscious processes; but, it is not
very clear how implicit processes differ from the uncon-
scious since both of them work associatively in forming
memories and learning processes. Both the implicit and
the unconscious processes are unintentional, and utilize
the same associative network of memory and procedures
to mould feelings, thoughts, and behaviours (Gilhooley
2008; Westen 1999). Therefore, the implicit and the un-
conscious can be used interchangeably to refer to the
formation or activation of association within or between
networks.
The unconscious associative network, without the
effective intervention of conscious awareness, conscious
control, or conscious intention, can result in implicit
learning (see Bunce et al. 1999; Cleeremans et al. 1998;
Eraut 2000; Esteves et al 1994; Guo et al. 2011; Lewicki
et al. 1987, 1992; Reber 1989, 1992; Rieber et al. 2004).
However, Hammonds (2006) argued that implicit learn-
ing occurs without verbal expression but not without
attention; it demands either voluntary or involuntary at-
tention (Hartman et al. 1989; Willingham and Goedert-
Eschmann 1999). As such, further investigations are
needed to understand how implicit learning pro-
cesses are dissociated from explicit learning pro-
cesses, thereby explaining how both of them require
attention (voluntary or involuntary), occur through
associative networks, and significantly influence feel-
ings, thoughts, and behaviours. Due to the difficulty
of such dissociation, the absence of verbal expression
Kuldas et al. SpringerPlus 2013, 2:105 Page 5 of 14
http://www.springerplus.com/content/2/1/105as the absence of voluntary attention is likely to be
detected in a related study.
Unconscious learning allows people to successfully
cope with the complexity of their learning tasks (Lewicki
et al. 1992), as well as with the activities of acculturation
and socialization, implicitly acquiring social skills with
respect to tolerable social behaviour, attitudes, and cul-
tural worldview (Lewicki et al. 1987; Reber 1992). Learn-
ing how to speak a native language, how to listen and
interact with others, and how to use general problem
solving strategies are some examples of unconscious
learning, which is particularly conceived to be easily,
rapidly, and unconsciously acquired biologically primary
knowledge (Sweller and Sweller 2006). Primary know-
ledge structures are information categories that human
have evolved to acquire and use for processing biologic-
ally secondary knowledge, such as learning to read and
write (Geary 2002). Humans have gradually evolved to
deal with secondary knowledge; hence, the manner in
which listening and speaking develop differs markedly
from the manner in which reading and writing is learned
(Sweller and Sweller 2006). The unconscious acquisition
and application of primary knowledge are formed evolu-
tionarily prior to conscious learning activities, and are
not necessarily subject to conscious control or conscious
intention when they promptly and continually produce
responses to surrounding stimuli, rely heavily on
recognising an information pattern, improve the com-
plexity of information, or identify and disregard random
elements (Seger 1994). The outcomes of these activities
are more durable in memory, less affected by cognitive
insults (e.g. brain injury, dementia, or amnesia) and rela-
tively unaffected by errors or missing data (Seger 1994).
However, the outcomes or the activities may not be
completely be detached from voluntary or involuntary
attention and working memory capacity.
Thus, cognitive learning processes are not solely re-
stricted to the interference of conscious processing, con-
scious intention, conscious control, or conscious awareness
(Cleeremans et al. 1998; Scott and Dienes 2010). Conscious
processing can be ineffective in instantaneously and
continually guiding the learning processes from the first
microsecond to see, hear, taste, or to feel (Anderson 1992).
The following section serves to further elucidate these
arguments.
Human learning processes in the absence of
conscious interventions: The role of unconscious
mental representation
Human sensory organs and the brain do not simply per-
ceive information patterns in a dispersed manner from
the very beginning, but rather in a selected manner, ren-
dering human organisms functional before conscious
intervention. The brain does not receive disorganizedreports from the sensory organs; the reports on per-
ceived information patterns are probably not scattered
across the brain aimlessly or randomly (Geary 2002).
Human sensory organs and brain activities can be task
oriented (e.g. human survival) in the organization of
reports (Geary 2002; Sweller and Sweller 2006).
Whilst humans are unconscious of how information is
being organized, their organisms, such as the brain and
sensory organs, seem to be conscious of their tasks, the
information they form and the places to which they re-
port on that information. Therefore, without resorting to
a conscious process, such as intention, to raise questions
to perceived information, one can unconsciously ask
questions and seek answers without knowing the under-
lying factors of these behaviours (Chartrand and Bargh
1996; Greenwald and Banaji 1995; Jacoby et al. 1992).
However, the recognition of both questions and answers
may need a conscious process (e.g. controlled attention
or conscious intention). Both conscious and unconscious
processes can associatively initiate and sustain goal di-
rected behaviour, such as decision making (Aarts and
Van Den Bos 2011; Custers and Aarts 2010). This
conscious interference in the associative activities does
not mean that the conscious processes can completely
deactivate automatic or unconscious processing in the
brain to organize perceptual and cognitive processes of
learning (Aizenstein et al. 2004).
It is improbable that humans immediately and persist-
ently prioritize conscious processes to evaluate and
verbalize personal experiences, either positively or nega-
tively. There should be an automatic evaluation system
for information processing when the conscious processes
are not performing effectively. Relying on auto-positive
evaluations, humans tend to confront what is being
experienced, but avoid experiencing what was auto-
negatively evaluated (Epstein 1994). These auto-evaluations
can spontaneously construct and reactivate mental repre-
sentations, which, in turn, build an interaction within and
between patterns of subjective experiences (Andersen et al.
1995). Spontaneously constructed mental representations
can guide thoughts and behaviours (Seel 2003) and, thus,
be responsible for the evaluation of information in the
absence of effective conscious interference (Cohen et al.
1996). The interference of mental representations is not in-
stantaneously accessible to the conscious processes, nor is
it readily transformed into verbal expressions (Disessa and
Sherin 1998). Although mental representations can be
constructed from both words and images; they are heavily
influenced by the latter rather than the former (MacDonald
et al. 1992; Trueswell et al. 1994).
One of the forms of mental representation is imagery
(Paivio 1986). Imagery can be a visual mode of the brain
state (Kosslyn et al. 2001). However, it is not merely a
visual mode, but also a mode of quasi-visual phenomena.
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modes underlie kinaesthetic imagery, haptic imagery, or
olfactory imagery (see Bensafi et al. 2003; Klatzky et al.
1991; Stevens 2005). Mental imagery manifests through
the perception of a real or unreal form of a physical
object. Without the perception of a physical object, the
imagery is unlikely to take place in the brain (see
Kosslyn 2005; O'Regan and Noë 2001; Pylyshyn 2003).
Mental imagery can bring motivational and manipula-
tive effects of memories into memory processes (Kuldas
et al. 2012). Imagery formation and its effects on the
information-processing stages may be monitored by
unconscious and conscious intention; the latter can be
based in a preliminary stage of the former (Henningsen
2010). Mental imagery can motivate people to achieve
their desires, even if such a desire is not actually present
to their senses (Kavanagh et al. 2005). However, such a
desire should address to a physical object unlike verbal
representations of abstract concepts, such as angle or
God. The imagery can enable people to avoid unpleasant
thoughts that unintentionally entered into whatever they
remember, expect, or learn (Faw 1997; Marks 1999). Im-
agery affects thought processes regardless of whether
they refer to past or present personal experiences (Paivio
1991). Therefore, imagery should be considered as a
certain type of mental representation, and not merely as
a form of past experience.
In consequence, unconscious mental representations
can be operative, either in the absence of or in the pres-
ence of conscious processes, thereby reducing conscious
effort in the preparation and evaluation, acceptance or
rejection of information patterns, such as making mean-
ing of concepts. Thus, the unconscious processes can
organize memory, conceptual meanings, and consolidate
the conscious processes of learning.The role of unconscious mental representations in
conceptual learning processes
Human learning is manifested through multidimensional
but interacting perceptual, cognitive, and emotional
processes. Any kind of learning is unlikely to occur
effectively without the interaction between prior know-
ledge and cognitive abilities, and the emotional and mo-
tivational states of learners (Moreno 2010; Seel 2001).
This interaction allows humans to grasp the reality of
experiences, to generate ideas and concepts, and to set
personal goals or interests. It can be frequently mediated
by unconscious mental representations, providing the
memory with information forming at the abstract and
concrete levels based on both present and past experi-
ences (Brewer and Schommer-Aikins 2006; Marks 1999;
Sadoski et al. 1997). These effects of unconscious mental
representations are one of the less controversial issues inpsychology as well as in philosophy (Abell and Currie
1999; Von Eckardt 1988).
Unconscious representations can facilitate the integra-
tion of illustrated verbal and visual information with one
another (i.e. the integration of maps, charts, graphics, di-
agrams, film strips, slides, or pictures with texts in text-
books, classroom presentations, instructional manuals,
and with computer based instructions), referred to as an
imagery style of learning (Clark and Paivio 1991; Kuldas
et al. 2012). The learning style can render learners assist-
ance in interpreting and absorbing the meanings of
information in an accelerating and retaining manner
(Chun and Plass 1996; Kulhavy et al. 1993; Sadoski et al.
1997; Rieber 1990, 1991), improve their problem solving,
creative, and critical thinking skills (Paivio 1986). To this
end, instructional designs should properly be aligned
with students’ expertise levels in cognitive learning tasks
to avoid overburdening their working memory capacity
(Schnotz and Kürschner 2007; Wallen et al. 2005).
Unconscious representations can play a facilitatory
role in the acquisition of conceptual knowledge and thus
in the occurrence of conceptual learning (Ziori and
Dienes 2006), provided that educators pictorially illustrate
concepts in a manner closely referring to their contextual
meanings (Paivio 2007). Mental representations allow
students to acquire and make meanings consciously or
unconsciously (Winn 1987), requiring more or less con-
sciously accessible knowledge about what to acquire
(Dienes et al. 1991; Perruchet and Pacteau 1991). However,
this requirement does not mean that making meaning of
concepts with the help of their pictorial illustrations ne-
cessarily depends on effective conscious intervention
(Gambrell and Bales 1986; Paivio 2007). Deliberate in-
terventions may remain ineffective in forming a con-
nection between dissimilar features of illustrations;
whereas, it can be relatively effective in the case of
similar features (Borst and Kosslyn 2008).
Illustrations help students to visualize the proper
meaning of presented concepts (Dechsri et al. 1997;
Heinich et al. 1999) before relying on their conceptual
knowledge (Laufer and Sim 1985). Conscious knowledge
cannot be instantaneously or constantly accessible and
applicable, mainly due to the limited deliberate attention
span and working memory capacity (Unsworth and
Engle 2007). On the contrary, an unconscious associ-
ation between meanings and pictures of presented con-
cepts can be formed through unconscious associative
networks because they are not necessarily dependent on
working memory capacity (Anderson 1995).
If a concept does not properly refer to its common
structural properties, such as form, content, context, ob-
ject, and subject, there may appear many interpretations
or several other potential meanings which can be made
from distinct mental representations of these properties
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plore the illustrations of these structural properties to
find relevant information under specific guidance, they
will grasp comprehensive and persuasive meanings of
what is being presented, resulting in effective teaching
outcomes (Lowe 1996; Stringer and Irwing 1998). Pre-
senting information that is familiar to students or rele-
vant to their prior knowledge can allow them to recall
the relevant content of information (Ranzijn 1991; Wolfe
and Woodwyk 2010), even though students might infer
another meaning onto which they have imposed person-
alized interpretations or preferences (Vermunt 1998).
Accordingly, the extent to which information about a
concept closely or directly refers to its form, content,
context, subject, or object, may facilitate its mental rep-
resentation, thereby helping students to retain and re-
hearse it more easily.
Rieber (1994) identified the common structural prop-
erties of concepts with attentional, affective, cognitive,
and compensatory functions. The attentional function
detects possible similarities between formerly and newly
learned concepts (Anderson 1993). Such a recall may
affect emotions and attitudes, referring to the affective
function, which is discerned by the cognitive function.
Students may have recourse to the compensatory func-
tion to decode the discerned affective function. The
more concepts are concrete, the better the understand-
ing of their contents can be (Beishuizen et al. 2002) and
the easier the visual illustrations of the common struc-
tural and functional properties representing their mean-
ings can be achieved (Benson 1997).
However, most probably there is no particular mental
representation and meaning permanently localized for a
corresponding concept in the human mind (DiSessa
2006). The representation of a concept is variable during
one’s life span and might simply be affected by cognitive
abilities, personal beliefs and experiences, and cultural
worldviews, as well as one’s age group and gender. The
representations of the relationship within and between
the common structural (i.e. form, content, context,
object, and subject) and functional (i.e. attentional,
affective, cognitive, and compensatory) properties of
concepts vary over time and from one situation to an-
other. Accordingly, optimal meanings of concepts are
not necessarily made from the ways students prefer to
visualize the common structural and functional proper-
ties of concepts (Heinich et al. 1999). Instead, students
can better understand concepts, which are strongly asso-
ciated with their properties more than those that are less
or not associated at all (Koren 1999). Such strong associ-
ations increase the likelihood of retention and the facili-
tation of recalling concepts (Chun and Plass 1996;
Mayer 1997; Mayer and Anderson 1992). This can be
because of the imagery traces of verbal definitions;concepts appropriately loaded with imagery values,
which are highly associated with the common structural
and functional properties (Danan 1992).
This imagery learning generally refers to the visual
learning style that can enable students to integrate the
common structural and functional properties with each
other through representational, referential, and associa-
tive processes (Paivio 1991). Through representational
processing, a stimulus can implicitly activate corre-
sponding memories. For example, the concrete word
“rose” can set the verbal memories in motion that trace
and activate the corresponding image of the rose and
vice versa, or an abstract word “love” can launch verbal
representations that raise personal expectations, happi-
ness or disappointment, providing the visualization of a
cheerful or resentful face. This cross-activation refers to
the referential processing through which the associative
processes may implicitly evoke many different images
and words from the one intended (Rieber 1994). How-
ever, human learning can occur more easily than without
the interactions between referential and associative pro-
cesses (Koren 1999). Learning these concepts through
the associative processes can be easier than without
these associations (Mayer 2003). Therefore, conceptual
learning can become more robust if it involves implicit
representational, referential, and associative processes
(Mayer and Anderson 1992), because they can assist
students in interpreting, making meaning, and in
comprehending insights into their educational experi-
ences (Paivio 1991). The role of these unconscious pro-
cesses is also readily observable in learning native
languages (Chomsky 1986; Keenan et al. 1998), in get-
ting accustomed to social norms and forming cultural
worldviews and personal beliefs (Kulkofsky et al. 2010).
However, these unconscious processes might have
some inhibitory effects on conscious learning processes
by evoking-task irrelevant thoughts and leading students
to devote their available working memory capacity to
processing these thoughts. Unconscious processing can
bring not only a mark of past experiences, but also
evaded or forgotten thoughts, into current emotional
states, behavioural tendencies, flow of thoughts, and into
learning processes (Haggerty et al. 2010; Schacter 1992;
Ziori and Dienes 2006). A series of studies on the use of
working memory demonstrated that negative emotions
(e.g., sadness, hopelessness) brought task-irrelevant
thoughts into conscious cognitive activities, thereby
unnecessarily loading the available capacity, diverting at-
tention from the task, and hampering memory perform-
ance (Ellis et al. 1995, 1997a,1997b). Similar evidence
related to motivational factors of academic achievements
indicated that the striving of students for the avoidance
of undesirable consequences of learning or of academic
task performance triggered disruptive thoughts, such as
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anxiety levels, and, thus, diverted their attention away
from the demands of the task (Pekrun et al. 2009;
Linnenbrink and Pintrich, 2002; Senko et al. 2011).
However, such evidence can be very reliable and valid
only if a detrimental effect of unconscious processing is
detected or identified apart from the effect of conscious
processing. Similarly, the non-detrimental effect of the
unconscious on conscious learning processes needs to
be carefully examined so that more evidence can be
presented for the contribution of the unconscious on
satisfactory learning outcomes.
The inhibitory effects of unconscious processing
characterize a difficult form of learning, because any in-
formation can easily be encoded, stored, and retrieved
by relevant stimuli; making it difficult to regulate how
and what has been learnt (Anderson et al. 1998; Huettig
and McQuenn 2011; Squire 1992; Thomson et al. 2010).
These influences of unconscious learning are not in-
stantaneously and always accessible to a prompt con-
scious intervention (Kihlstrom et al. 1992). In contrast,
Aizenstein et al. (2004) argued that conscious learning
processes might interfere in unconscious learning. How-
ever, it is not very clear how conscious learning could
interfere in the kind of learning that eludes conscious
awareness, particularly when one engages in emotional
experiences, implicit thoughts, fantasies, and uncon-
scious defences. Furthermore, not just thoughts, but
thinking itself can be unconscious (Kihlstrom 2008),
thereby causing more difficulty for the conscious inter-
ference to happen.
The conscious and unconscious functioning
capacity for the mental integration of pictorial
and verbal instructional materials
One of the main purposes of education is to make stu-
dents cognizant of how learning occurs and how it can
be developed, consciously engaging in their learning and
thinking activities, to achieve a desired change in their
behaviour. However, students at all levels cannot consist-
ently learn consciously (Smith 2003). Courses aimed to
teach students how to process information and think
consciously have not always produced durable and trans-
ferable achievements (see Chiesi et al. 2011; Garside
1996; Ten Dam and Volman 2004), although many stud-
ies have suggested that teaching students how to process
and apply information can improve their higher order
thinking skills (see Kuhn 1999; Kuhn and Dean 2005;
Wegerif 2011).
The scanty knowledge of learners and educators about
how human learning occurs can lead to ineffectiveness
in learning and teaching tasks (Veenman and Beishuizen
2004; Zohar 2004). Even though students and educators
acquire necessary knowledge and skills of what to do foroptimal learning, they do not necessarily achieve this
purpose; mainly due to the limited cognitive capacity for
conscious processing (Yuan et al. 2006), accessing and
applying the knowledge and skills (Nelson 1996;
Veenman et al. 2004). Therefore, both educators and
students must rely on unconscious processing not only
to encode, store, and retrieve information, but also to
construct and reactivate mental representations (Chen
and Bargh 1999; Lewicki et al. 1992). Thus, unconscious
processing can compensate for the restricted capacity of
conscious processing either in the absence or in the
presence of conscious awareness.
Moreover, consciously constructed knowledge struc-
tures can become automated as repeatedly being applied
to related cognitive learning tasks (Sweller et al. 1998).
Once coherent knowledge structures (cognitive sche-
mata) in long-term memory have been automated, stu-
dents will devote less cognitive capacity to work on
them (Van Gog et al. 2005). The operation of automated
schemata is not significantly impeded by the capacity
limitation in working memory (Van Merriënboer and
Sweller 2005). “Whereas there are severe capacity limits
to the amount of information from sensory memory that
working memory can process, there are no known limits
to the amount of information from long-term memory
that can be processed by working memory” (Sweller
2004 p 13). By virtue of automatized schemata “human
cognitive architecture handles complex material that
appears to exceed the capacity of working memory”
(Paas et al. 2003 p 2). Automated schemata steer human
behaviour without the need to be consciously processed,
and, thus, there will be available working memory
capacity for other cognitive activities (Van Merriënboer
and Sweller 2005).
However, neither novice nor advanced students can
always consciously or unconsciously construct coherent
knowledge structures or facilitatory mental representa-
tions to learn satisfactorily, particularly when their work-
ing memory capacity is overloaded or unnecessarily
loaded. Such a cognitive load leads to a split-attention
effect on verbal and visual representations whereby
students use their available cognitive capacity without
making significant contribution to their learning tasks
(Casey 2003; Kalyuga et al. 1999; Mayer et al. 2001;
Mayer and Moreno 2002). The overload can happen and
impede the learning processes of advanced students
when they are provided with redundant textual explana-
tions for a diagram, chart, or image (Sweller and Chandler
1994). The verbal explanations are not redundant for
novice students, provided that the novices are presented
with sufficient images corresponding to the verbal ex-
planation simultaneously rather than separately (Kalyuga
2012; Mayer et al. 1999; Pollock et al. 2002). For both
novice and advanced students, removing the redundant
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representations can be beneficial for better learning
(Chandler and Sweller 1991; Diao and Sweller 2007), be-
cause it is pictorial rather than textual information that
facilitates the construction of coherent mental represen-
tations (Kalyuga 2012). However, if the presented images
or symbols to describe the corresponding text are mul-
tiple, dynamic, and interactive, the learning processes of
novices can be impeded rather than improved (Bodemer
et al. 2004). Reduction in the variety of visual representa-
tions can help to moderate the involvement of distinct
mental representations (Schnotz and Bannert 2003) and
avoid the extraneous effort needed to map between the
visual and verbal representations, allowing more cogni-
tive effort to focus on deeper processing (Chandler and
Sweller 1991, 1992). However, reduction of the cognitive
load can sometimes impair learning rather than enhance
it when learning tasks do not challenge the cognitive ca-
pacity of students (Schnotz and Kürschner 2007). Lear-
ning cannot only be enhanced by the reduction of a
variety of different mental representations or excessive
information; it must also be adapting the degree of diffi-
culty of presented information or learning tasks to the
level of knowledge and cognitive ability of students
(Schnotz and Kürschner 2007).
As a result, at the outset of information processing,
unconscious mental representations can reduce the con-
scious effort to integrate the most part of the verbal and
the visual information with each other (Lewicki et al.
1992), thereby conducing to satisfactory learning outcomes
(Paivio 1991). However, in most educational studies
concerning the construction of teaching and learning
models, there is little or no room for the educational impli-
cation of the facilitatory role of unconscious representation.
Further studies have yet to be conducted to determine the
extent to which unconscious mental representations inhibit
or facilitate learning processes.
Finally, the effective design and application of teaching
aids require educators to better understand how to
facilitate the construction of meaningful mental repre-
sentations enhancing learning, mainly because learning
occurs when learners actively construct the representa-
tions from provided information, and well-designed in-
structional materials (Ifenthaler and Seel 2011; Mayer
et al. 1999; Seel and Blumschein 2009). Forms of mental
representations, such as mental models (representing
and communicating feelings, thoughts, ideas, and per-
sonal experiences), images, concepts, and schemata, en-
able individuals to process information, understanding
experience and events (Mayer et al. 1999). Rich and flex-
ible mental models improve a learner’s task performance
of any domain learning activity (Seel et al. 2006). Under-
standing an event and solving related problems presup-
poses either constructing the representations of relevantfeatures to the problem or activating appropriate sche-
mata (Ifenthaler and Seel 2011; Seel et al. 2009). Activa-
ting one of the forms allows a learner to integrate new
information into pre-existing schemata (knowledge
structures stored in long-term memory). An activated
schema runs automatically and regulates information
processing, a function which is vital for humans as it
allows new information to be processed very quickly and
enables them to adapt to their environment spontan-
eously (Ifenthaler and Seel 2011). In activating cognitive
schemata, the role of motivation, emotion, and uncon-
scious mental representations needs to be taken into
consideration (Thompson 2004). It might be motivation
and emotion that largely determine a learner’s cognitive
performance rather than working memory capacity; the
relationship between cognitive capacity, affect, and
motivation has not yet been understood sufficiently
(Moreno 2010).
Conclusion
This review has served to provide an insight into the
perceptual, cognitive, and emotional aspects of human
learning processes and outcomes, particularly into the
unconscious processes largely originated from the emo-
tional and motivational functions of the human psyche,
so as to enhance the understanding of the role of uncon-
scious functions in the mental integration of visual and
verbal instructional materials. To the aim, a set of pro-
posals for the unconscious processes and outcomes,
largely within perceptual, cognitive, social, evolutionary,
educational, and psychoanalytic psychology literature,
has been examined. The general consensus in the litera-
ture is that learning processes consist of interconnected
perceptual, cognitive, and emotional processing stages,
in which the unconscious is likely to precede the con-
scious. Learning processes must have an unconscious,
implicit, unintentional, intuitive, experiential, or auto-
matic processing stage, mainly due to limited conscious
processing capacity. Learning processes cannot be con-
stantly monitored at a high level of conscious process-
ing, particularly when students engage in a motivating
emotional state. The unconscious promptly works on in-
formation patterns from the first microsecond to see,
hear, taste, or to feel. Conscious processing has yet to be
detected in similar performance; it may be restricted be-
cause of its nature, of the limited capacity of working
memory, or of unconscious processes. Therefore, an un-
derstanding of human learning processes should not be
restricted to conscious learning.
Students can mentally integrate verbal and pictorial in-
structional materials unconsciously. Unconscious mental
representations can serve as a rapid mental integration
of visual and verbal information, thereby supplying in-
formation for conscious processing. Thus, unconscious
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the conscious processes, thereby laying the foundation
of human learning. Unconscious representations may
consolidate conscious learning processes, if verbal and
visual instructional materials are spatially integrated as a
way to avoid the unnecessary use of the available visual
and verbal memory capacity. This avoidance, in turn,
can facilitate mental representation or mental integra-
tion and ameliorate the challenge of teaching students to
organize their learning processes.
Although any psychological study concerned, even re-
motely, with cognitive learning processes would agree
that, to some extent, the processes necessarily work un-
consciously, the educational implication of unconscious
processing has yet to be proposed. This review suggests
further examination of the contribution of unconscious
processing to teaching and learning activities, inasmuch
as neither educators nor students can always consciously
be aware of their teaching and learning processes. The
inhibitory role of unconscious processing in the integra-
tion of verbal and pictorial instructional materials might
be examined with respect to the use of cognitive ca-
pacity, revealing whether this capacity is highly loaded
by task-irrelevant thoughts, which are unconsciously
brought into conscious processing. Such an examination
would enhance the understanding of the advantages and
disadvantages of unconscious learning processes in the
mental integration of visual and verbal information.
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